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Abstract: In this paper, I engage with a recent contextualist account of
gender terms (particularly, “woman”) proposed by Díaz-León, E. 2016.
“Woman as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle.” Hypatia
31 (2): 245–58. Díaz-León’s main aim is to improve both on previous con-
textualist and non-contextualist views and solve a certain puzzle for femi-
nists. Central to this task is putting forward a view that allows trans women
who did not undergo gender-affirming medical procedures to use the gender
terms of their choice to self-identify. My goal is to investigate Díaz-León’s
proposal, point out (what I take to be) several shortcomings of the view and
discuss possible replies on her part.
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1 Introduction
Recent work in feminist philosophy of language has given particular attention to
providing a better account of the meaning of gender terms, especially “woman”.
Whilemost authors agree that the current concept needs to be ameliorated (so that,
for example, it includes transwomen), it is not clearwhat is the bestway to proceed
here.1 In this reply paper, I aim at contributing to the debate by engaging with Esa
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1 An essential contribution in this framework is, of course, Haslanger’s (2000). For general crit-
icism of ameliorative projects as not being enough to actually improve the lives of trans women,
see Kapusta (2016) and Bettcher (2017).
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Díaz-León's (2016) recent contextualist proposal about the term “woman” that
attempts to improve on previous views. My goal is thus to investigate Díaz-León’s
proposal, to point out (what I take to be) several shortcomings of the view, and to
discuss possible replies on her part.
A few preliminary remarks. First, while Díaz-León is sympathetic to the moral
and political ideals previous feminists have promoted, she is very explicit that her
project is descriptive rather than ameliorative. The critical remarks Iwill offer apply
to the view taken either as a descriptive or as an ameliorative project. Second, my
focuswill be almost entirely on trans peoplewhodid not undergo gender-affirming
medical procedures. This is in line both with trans people’s fight against
discrimination and with them being a test-case for various views of gender and
gender terms (including Díaz-León’s project). Third and finally, while I intend my
considerations to apply to all gender terms, Iwill use examples involving “woman”
in order to ensure continuity with previous discussions.
Díaz-León’s version of contextualism aims to improve on previous con-
textualist views – in particular Jennifer Saul’s (2012) – which in turn are taken to
mark an improvement over traditional (invariantist) views. Two such latter views
have been distinguished: according to the first, sentences containing the term
“woman” are true in virtue of the subject possessing certain biological traits (va-
gina, ovaries, XX chromosomes etc.); according to the second, such sentences are
true in virtue of the subject fulfilling a certain societal role (child bearer, house-
keeper etc.). Both views have been found inadequate for various reasons,2 but for
the purpose of this paper themain complaint is that they donot account for theway
trans women use gender terms to self-identify. Thus, sentence
(G) Charla is a woman,
where Charla is a trans woman who did not undergo gender-affirming medical
procedures, comes out as false according to the first view, since she does not
possess the biological traits required. It may also come out as false according to the
second view, since Charla might easily not fulfill the societal role required. Trans
women who did not undergo gender-affirming medical procedures, like Charla,
thus pose a problem for both views.
Contextualism attempts to improve matters by taking “woman” to be context-
sensitive. This move is supported by the perceived variation in truth-value of sen-
tences like (G) across contexts. For example, in a context where the issue is whether
Charla shouldbeable touse thewomen’s bathroom, (G) is intuitively3 true,while ina
2 See Ayala and Vasilyeva (2015), Díaz-León (2016), Jenkins (2016), Mikkola (2019), Saul (2012),
Saul and Díaz-León (2018) etc.
3 The issue of the role, nature, andweight to be given to intuitions in semantic theorizing is vexed.
Yet, appeal to intuitions (of truth-value, in this case) remains one of the ways in which data for
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context where the issue is whether Charla should be screened for diseases related to
female genitalia, (G) is intuitively false. Such variation is borne out by the version of
contextualismdiscussedby Saul (2012), according towhich (G) “is true in a contextC
iff [Charla] ishumanandrelevantlysimilar (accordingto thestandardsatwork inC) to
mostofthosepossessingallofthebiologicalmarkersoffemalesex” (Saul2012,p.201).
While this definition incorporates biological traits, what varies across contexts is the
standard of similarity between the subject of the attribution and most of those pos-
sessing thebiologicalmarkersof femalesex. In thecontextwhere the issue iswhether
Charla should be able to use the women’s bathroom, the standard of similarity be-
tweenCharla andmost of thosepossessing all of thebiologicalmarkers of female sex
simply consists in self-identifying as a woman; hence, (G) comes out as true in this
context. In the context where the issue is whether Charla should be screened for
diseases related to female genitalia, the standard of similarity between Charla and
mostof thosepossessingallof thebiologicalmarkersoffemalesexconsists inactually
possessing female genitalia; hence (G) comes out as false in this context.
Yet, as Saul herself acknowledges, the view has a similar problem with sen-
tences like (G) to that besetting the views it attempts to improve upon. To see this,
we should consider the fact that sentences like (G) and their negations are uttered
not only by trans people and their allies, but by transphobes4 too. If the latter is the
case, since according to the view “the standards at work in C” are those of the
speaker, it is the standard of similarity of the transphobe that determines the
semantic theories are gathered. What I findmore problematic in this context is reliance onmy own
intuitions. Experimental studiesmight be able to help here, but they aremissing from the literature
on the semantics of gender terms. Also, intuitions seem to be more valuable when the context in
better described (or known, in case of actual utterances). I thus acknowledge the limitation of this
approach and I fully agree that my own intuitions should ultimately not be givenmuchweight – at
least not as much as, say, those of trans people, who are essentially involved in the realities
surrounding the use of sentences like (G), to whom I’m happy to defer (see also footnote 14 in
relation to CASE 3 below).
4 “Transphobe” might be considered a sensitive term, one that is perhaps prone to linguistic
abuse. In the way I understand it in this paper, “transphobe” refers to someone who believes that
there are no circumstances under which trans people have the gender they self-identify as having
– that is, that there are no contexts in which (G) comes out as true. Construing “transphobe” in this
way (i.e., by reference to people’s beliefs) is not to deny that transphobia is a structural phe-
nomenon. As a reviewer notes, the nature of the connection between the structural phenomenon
and the particular behavior (including linguistic behavior) of individuals is an important issue, but
not one that I can hope to address in this paper. (For helpful ideas in this connection, seeMcGowan
(2019) in relation to hate speech and Popa-Wyatt/Wyatt (2018) in relation to slurs.). Finally, I
acknowledge that even conceived in this rather strict way, my use of “transphobe” might prompt
disagreement; however, given the ameliorative framework adopted in this paper, this might be
expected.
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sentence’s truth-value. And since for the transphobe presumably the standard of
similarity with most of those possessing all the markers of female sex is actually
possessing those markers, (G) comes out as false and its negation as true in the
mouth of the transphobe. This is a highly unsatisfactory result. While it is
important for trans people to be able use the gender terms of their choice to self-
identify, it is equally important that such self-identification be respected by others.
Díaz-León’s subject-contextualism comes to the rescue by modifying the view
in two crucial respects. First, instead of the speaker, she centers the view on the
subject. To mark the difference, Díaz-León follows Keith DeRose (1992) in dis-
tinguishing between attributor-contextualism and subject-contextualism. Ac-
cording to the former, it is the attributor (or how things stand in the attributor’s
context) who “calls the shots”, while according to the latter it is the subject (or how
things stand in the subject’s context) who does. While Díaz-León takes the view
considered by Saul to be an instance of attributor-contextualism about gender
terms, she herself advocates subject-contextualism. Second, Díaz-León has a
precise viewaboutwhat it is that determines the required standard of similarity in a
context. In the version of contextualism discussed by Saul, among the factors that
do so are the speaker’s beliefs and intentions, what the speaker “has in mind”. In
contrast, Díaz-León submits that such factors play no role and replaces them with
objective considerations relevant for practical purposes, the latter conceived as
broadly as to include theoretical, prudential, moral, political, esthetic etc.
considerations.
This view neatly accounts for the variation in truth-value of sentences like
(G) across contexts. According to it, an utterance of (G) “will be true if and only if
[Charla] is similar tomost females with respect to the standards that are relevant in
[Charla]’s context, given the practical purposes that are relevant in this context,
where this should be determined by our best theoretical and normative consid-
erations.” (Díaz-León 2016, p. 249). Applying this view gets the truth-value of
(G) right both in the contextwhere the issue iswhether Charla should be able to use
the women’s bathroom (true) and in that where the issue is whether Charla should
be screened for diseases related to female genitalia (false), for the same reason:
that this is what our best theoretical and normative considerations dictate. In
addition – and crucially –, Díaz-León’s view doesn’t face the problem posed by the
truth-value of sentences like (G) in the mouth of the transphobe because, for her,
the beliefs of the speaker are not what determine the relevant similarity between
the subject and most females in a given context. What does, instead, are the
normative and theoretical considerations that pertain to the practical purpose of
giving trans people the right to use the gender terms of their choice to self-identify.
Thus, according to Díaz-León’s view, (G) comes out as true and its negation as false
in the mouth of the transphobe – a highly satisfactory result.
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2 “Woman” in Medical Contexts
While I think that Díaz-León’s view is a significant improvement over previous
accounts of gender terms, especially in connection to the main issue focused on
here, several aspects of the view remain, inmy view, problematic. One such aspect
concerns the claim, made by both Saul and Díaz-León, that sentences like (G) are
intuitively false in medical contexts like those mentioned above.5 For Díaz-León,
instrumental considerations such as avoiding suffering and/or preventing the
spreading of the disease are those that determine the truth-value of sentences like
(G) in such contexts, and these considerations demand that the standard of sim-
ilarity between Charla and most females is the possession of female genitalia. Her
view thus predicts that (G) is false when uttered in a medical context, since Charla
(by stipulation) doesn’t possess female genitalia.
This result might be in tension with the pledge to fight for the right of trans
people to use the gender terms of their choice to self-identify. For note that, ac-
cording toDíaz-León, sentences like (G) are false inmedical contexts even if Charla
self-identifies, in that very context, as a woman. This has been deemed problem-
atic6– especially given thatmedical scenarios inwhich trans people use the gender
terms of their choice to self-identify are not hard to comeby. In fact, some countries
have explicit regulations in place for medical personnel designed to preserve the
right of trans people to be called, even in medical contexts, by the gender terms
they themselves use to self-identify.7
Now, Díaz-León is aware of this problem and, in a footnote, she writes: “If it is
true that our best normative considerations show that it is wrong to say that (some)
transwomen are not women inmedical contexts (…) then itwill (…) be the case that
woman in this case refers (…) to those who identify as women.” (Díaz-León 2016, p.
256) As it stands, this answer does take care of the problem mentioned, but has an
unwanted consequence – namely, it leads to the view’s own demise. As we have
seen, one motivation for adopting a contextualist view about gender terms is to
account for the variation in truth-value of sentences like (G) across contexts. This
means that the contextualist has to allow that sentences like (G) are false in certain
5 As a reviewer points out, they claim this for different reasons. In Saul’s case, in the example of a
medical context she analyzes, the clinic has been instructed to screen all women for diseases
related to female genitalia, while in Díaz-León’s case it is assumed that there are good normative
reasons for using “woman” to refer to biological sex in medical contexts. While this difference
plays a role in differentiating the two views, it doesn’t seem to affect the points I’m making.
6 See, for example, Bettcher (2009) for forcefully making this point.
7 See, for example, the website of The Canadian Medical Protective Association (https://www.
cmpa-acpm.ca/en/advice-publications/browse-articles/2015/treating-transgendered-
individuals).
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contexts, otherwise there won’t be any variation in truth-value to capture and thus
no initial motivation for the view. On the other hand, given the motivation to
vindicate the truth of sentences like (G) in the mouth of the transphobe, the con-
textualist has to impose certain demands on the contexts in which sentences like
(G) are predicted to be false. The obvious answer is that such contexts are those in
which the falsity of sentences like (G) is consistent with “our best theoretical and
normative considerations”. But, given Díaz-León’s willingness to concede that even
in medical context sentences like (G) might be true, one wonders what the contexts
inwhich they areallowed tobe false are.8 If no such contexts canbe found– that is, if
all contexts are such that the truthof sentences like (G) in those contexts is consistent
with “our best theoretical and normative considerations” – then a much better
semantics for gender terms would be an invariantist rather than a contextualist one.
To put it bluntly: if Díaz-León’s answer to the initial problem is accepted, her con-
textualist view seems to be in danger of collapsing into invariantism.9
3 Relying on Substantive Assumptions About
Morality
Another potentially problematic issue with Díaz-León’s view concerns the most
important benefit that she can claim for it: namely, that the view fares better than
previous contextualist ones in solving the problem posed by the truth-value of
sentences like (G) in the mouth of the transphobe. Díaz-León was able to fend off
this problemby centering not on the attributor, but on the subject; by claiming that
the practical purposes that determine the relevant standard of similarity and thus
ultimately determine the truth-value of sentences like (G) are objective; and finally,
by holding that such practical considerations should be “determined by our best
theoretical and normative considerations” (my emphasis).
The main worry that I want to press here is related to the question who is “we”
in the quote above. It is a truism that people with similar views tend to form
8 Saul (2012) offers the sentence “This bone belonged to a woman”, uttered by a forensic doctor
after examining a bone that might have belonged to a trans woman who did not undergo gender-
affirming medical procedures. When discussing this example, Díaz-León answers the question in
the same way as she does in the case of (G) as uttered in medical contexts. This answer makes the
search for contexts in which the use of “woman” unequivocally leads to false sentences evenmore
difficult.
9 Bettcher (2017) makes a similar point. Laskowski (2020) provides a more elaborate argument,
based on a case involving utterances of (G) in rape crisis centers – not medical contexts of the kind
considered above, but quite similar to them. To echo Laskowski, such convergence in objecting to
Díaz-León’s is indeed encouraging.
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communities, founded on theoretical and normative considerations that (most of)
their members hold. People with different views tend to form different commu-
nities, and the theoretical and normative considerations those communities are
founded on can be very different. Now, Díaz-León’s claim is that such consider-
ations establish the standard of similarity needed for determining the truth-value
of sentences like (G) in context. Thus, the truth-value of such sentences depends on
whose considerations we consider. There is no problem, of course, when “we”
comprises trans people and their allies, but what happens when “we” comprises
(only) transphobes? The theoretical and normative considerations that the com-
munity of transphobes is based on are very different from those of the communities
formed by trans people and their allies. If we consider those of the community of
transphobes, (G) comes out as false after all! It thus seems that, eventually, Díaz-
León’s view falls prey to the same problem as attributor-contextualism.
Now, it might be said that Díaz-León has already provided a way out of this
worry, based on the fact that she takes the theoretical and normative consider-
ations to be objective, or universal, thus rendering my point above about their
relativization to communities moot. Under this way of seeing things, either trans
people and their allies or the transphobes are right about the matter. A complaint
onemight have in relation to such an answer is that it comes very close to holding a
realist view aboutmorality (or normativity in general). Althoughmoral realism has
its fair share of supporters (e.g., Enoch (2011)), many have found moral realism
objectionable. It is not my aim here to argue for or against moral realism; rather,
what I want to point out is that Díaz-León’s view about gender terms, while not
strictly speaking implying moral realism, is dependent on it in order to solve the
problem at hand. Since solving that problem has been claimed to be the view’s
main advantage over alternative versions of contextualism, as well as over
invariantist views, the view stands or falls with it. This might be considered a very
heavy burden for a semantic view and a good reason to adopt an alternative one
that has no such commitments. At minimum, this is not an easy position to be in.10
10 Perhaps away tomitigate the force of this objection is to say thatwhat Díaz-León needs in order
to give the right account of the truth-value of sentence like (G) in themouth of the transphobe is not
moral realism, but something weaker: some conception of morality rooted in inter-subjectivity, or
appeal to some moral theory postulating ideal agents etc. – ideas that support universality rather
than moral realism per se. While I agree that such ideas are available to Díaz-León, the point
remains that relying on substantial (and controversial) views about morality constitutes a sig-
nificant burden for her (and any) semantic view.
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4 Subjects, Communities, and Their Relation
As we have seen, the two chief tenets of Díaz-León’s subject-contextualist view
are that (i) it is the subject, not the attributor, who “calls the shots”; (ii) certain
features of the subject’s context (objective features such as “instrumental, moral,
and political considerations having to do with how [the subject] should be
treated” (Díaz-León 2016, p. 251) are what determines the relevant similarity
relation between the subject and most females. In this section, I attempt to show
that various possible interactions between the subject and the community whose
best theoretical and normative considerations are relevant lead to tensions be-
tween i) and ii). This will allow me to consider various ways of interpreting or
developing Díaz-León’s view.
I start with devising two types of case, both of which show that the theo-
retical and normative considerations Díaz-León thinks are crucial for deter-
mining the truth-value of sentences like (G) are irrelevant, yet they pose slightly
different problems. The first type of case is characterized by the subject lacking
access to the instrumental, moral, political etc. considerations needed for such
sentences to receive a truth-value. To illustrate, consider the following
scenario:
CASE 1
Charla is part of an old community of trans people and neither she nor other people in her
community have been discriminated against on the basis of their gender. In fact, things have
been going so well that neither Charla nor anyone in her surroundings has ever attended to
normative and theoretical considerations related to gender.
To be sure, Charla’s happy situation borders on the ideal, but it is nevertheless
conceivable. In such a scenario, although (G) as uttered by someone in Charla’s
community is intuitively true, it seems to be so independently of the normative and
theoretical considerations Díaz-León thinks are instrumental in determining the
standard of similarity between Charla andmost females. The second type of case is
one in which there is a contradiction (or at least a rift) between our instrumental,
moral, political considerations and those of the subject. Consider thus the
following scenario:
CASE 2
Charla self-identifies as a woman, but she doesn’t share the theoretical and normative con-
siderations and ideals of those who consider that trans and cis people should be treated
equally. In fact, Charla entirely subscribes to the view that trans people are morally corrupt
(perhaps she has grown up in a strict religious environment, or has been subjected to
indoctrination etc.).
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This is surely an extreme situation (although not entirely unrealistic), but, again, it
is nevertheless conceivable. In such a scenario, when Charla utters (G) the sen-
tence is intuitively true, yet it seems to be so independently of the normative and
theoretical considerations Díaz-León thinks are instrumental in determining the
standard of similarity between Charla and most females.
This is an unwelcome result for the semantics of gender terms, for the
following reason. When dealing with context-sensitive terms, semanticists aim
to isolate the factors responsible for the terms’ sensitivity to context and which
determine the truth-values of sentences containing the terms at stake. In the
case of indexicals like “I”, “now” or “here”, those factors have been taken to be
the speaker/agent of the context, the time of the context and the place of the
context, respectively. For terms less obviously context-sensitive, for example
gradable adjectives such as “rich”, that factor has been taken to be (perhaps
among others) a comparison class – and so on and so forth. However, it would
be a bad result for a view isolating a certain contextual factor to find contexts in
which a sentence containing the corresponding term is uttered without the
contextual factor playing any role in determining its truth-value. Now, it is the
premise of Díaz-León’s view that gender terms are context-sensitive. She has
isolated a certain factor that is responsible for these terms’ sensitivity to context
and for determining the truth-value of sentences containing them – namely, our
best normative and theoretical considerations that determine the standard of
similarity in context. However, if a sentence containing a gender term is used in
a context, but the isolated factor is idle, then something has gone awry. The two
cases above show that this is precisely what can happen with sentences
like (G).11
In reply, it could be argued on Díaz-León’s behalf that, while the cases are
possible, they are nevertheless not problematic. The thought here is that, while the
subject either doesn’t have access (CASE 1) or entertains beliefs that contradict
(CASE 2) those normative and theoretical considerations, it is always those con-
siderations that determine the truth-value of sentences like (G) in context,
regardless of what the subject thinks. Such a reply would be in line with Díaz-
León’s willingness to eschew beliefs and intentions from taking central stage in
semantics. This view – that is, the view that our best normative and theoretical
11 Amore general complaint to letting normative (moral) considerations into semantics has been
put forward by Davies, Kaplinski, and Lepamets (2019), who have run several experiments testing
how moral considerations affected the participants’ propensity to judge differently the same
sentence in different (morally charged) contexts. Their conclusion is that the “moral encroach-
ment” required by Díaz-León’s view is not very strongly supported. Although I find their experi-
ments highly relevant for the issue at stake, I am happy to concede that moral encroachment is
generally unproblematic and focus more on the details of Díaz-León’s view.
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considerations always trump the subject’s beliefs and intentions – accounts easily
for CASE 1 and CASE 2, given that the prevalence of our best normative and
theoretical considerations makes it so that the relevant sentences in the two sce-
narios come out as true, which is in line with our intuitions.
However, I think that such a line of reply is too strong. First, it seems tome that
the intuitions about the relevant sentences in CASE 1 and CASE 2 concern not only
their truth-value, but also the factors responsible for their truth. In both cases the
driving force behind the intuition that the relevant sentences are true is the fact
that Charla self-identifies as a woman, not any normative and theoretical con-
siderations, best or otherwise. It is perhaps pointless to argue about intuitions; yet,
something should be said about why the intuitions in the two cases seem to point
towards more than simply the truth-value of the sentences involved.
Second and more importantly, the reply considered gives rise to the following
worry. One of themain tenets of Díaz-León’s view is that the subject (or how things
stand in the subject’s context) “calls the shots”; this is, in fact, why the view is
called “subject-contextualism”. Yet, she places a very strong accent onwhat others
think about the subject, as per her claim that “practical purposes are determined
by our best theoretical and normative considerations”. This goes smoothly when
there is convergence between us and the subject, but becomes problematic when
such convergence is lacking. By taking our best normative and theoretical con-
siderations to always trump the subject’s beliefs and intentions, it becomesunclear
whether the view upholds the tenet that the subject “calls the shots”. To put it
differently, the subject in subject-contextualism doesn’t seem to enjoy a great deal
of (or, at least, not complete) autonomy.
Now, the notion of autonomy is one of the most disputed ones in philosophy,
and it is quite probable that a definitive answer to what it amounts to is not
forthcoming soon. Additionally, feminism has a long history of (mostly) critical
engagement with the concept of autonomy.12 However, placing the decision about
one’s gender in the hands of others (no matter how enlightened morally and
politically they are), andnot in that of the subject, seems a violation of the subject’s
autonomy – at least in an intuitive sense. A notion of autonomy that comprises the
right tomakedecisions about one’s owngender doesn’t seem tome too far-fetched.
It might be that alternative notions of autonomy that fit well with the idea inves-
tigated here can be found. Yet, when measured against the ideal of improving the
lives of trans people, this failure to account for the (intuitive) autonomy of such
12 See Buss (2018) for a useful overview of the various options concerning (personal) autonomy,
and Stoljar (2018) for a thorough presentation of various feminist critiques of and views about that
notion.
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subjects is less than ideal. This gives one reason to think that, at best, “subject-
contextualism” is a misnomer.13
Aweaker position than the one discussed above is to allow that normative and
theoretical considerations determine the truth-value of sentences like (G) in some,
but not all, contexts. This move would take care of CASE 1 and CASE 2, given that it
is not such considerations that determine (G)’s truth-value in those cases, but other
factors – that is, self-identification. Views according to whichmore than one factor
is isolated as being responsible for the context-sensitivity of a certain type of
expression are not unheard of in semantics: in the literature about indexicals and
demonstratives, for example, Gauker (2008) holds the view that what determines
their referent consists in a wide range of factors, both objective and subjective.
However, in order for such a view to be viable, principled reasons for why a
certain factor becomes the one that determines the truth-value of the relevant
sentences in the detriment of another need to be provided. In the case at hand, one
needs to tell us why in certain contexts self-identification trumps our best
normative and theoretical considerations, and why the reverse happens in other
contexts. Obviously, the answer cannot be simply that it accounts for scenarios like
CASE 1 and CASE 2; that would be completely ad-hoc. A better answer lacking,
pursuing this way of solving the problem signaled can hardly be considered
progress.
A different way in which the problem can be addressed is to claim that self-
identification is itself part of the normative and theoretical considerations that
determine the truth-value of sentences like (G) in context. This idea can be
implemented in at least two ways. One is to claim that self-identification is always
required for the normative and theoretical considerations to determine the truth-
value of sentences like (G) in context; the other is to deny the claim above and
maintain instead that whenever present, self-identification itself amounts to a
normative and theoretical consideration of the relevant type. (In other words,
13 A reviewer suggests a possible move on Díaz-León’s part to counter the lack of autonomy
objection: namely, to claim that the intuition that self-identification matters in CASES 1 and 2 is
explained precisely by the fact that the autonomy of the subject is recognized and respected, in
concordance with our best theoretical and normative considerations. This is similar to the move I
discuss below, but without the semantic element. I agree that this route is open to Díaz-León.
However, as the reviewer also notes, CASES 4 and 5might be taken to raise additional problems, in
that respecting the subject’s autonomy seems to be trumped by other normative considerations.
Since Díaz-León discusses neither autonomy nor cases like these, it is hard to see what her
response would be; so perhaps this objection can be rephrased as an invitation for her to consider
such issues. I’m grateful to the reviewer for making me consider this reply.
Subject-Contextualism and the Meaning of Gender Terms 11
when a person self-identifies as a woman, that very fact should count in our
normative and theoretical considerations.) Let me take each way in turn.
The first way to implement the idea under consideration, while successfully
dealing with CASE 1 and CASE 2, goes too far. To demand that self-identification is
always required leads to the view yielding unwanted predictions. Consider thus
the following scenario:
CASE 3
Charla doesn’t self-identify as a woman but has behaved throughout her life in ways that are
generally and usually considered to constitute the life of a woman. In addition, she is
discriminated against precisely due to her behavior. (In other words, she “passes as a
woman” for those in her environment, even though she doesn’t self-identify as such.)
My intuition14 in this case is that (G), as uttered by someone in Charla’s environ-
ment, is true. Moreover, I think that according to our best normative and theo-
retical considerations Charla should count as a woman. Under the implementation
of the idea considered, the standard of similarity between Charla andmost females
for the practical purposes relevant in this context as determined by our best
theoretical and normative considerations has to consist in (since it is required) self-
identifying as a woman. But since Charla doesn’t self-identify as a woman,
(G) comes out as false in this context – an unwanted result.
The secondway to implement the idea under consideration ismore reasonable
and has better chances to respond adequately to the problem at hand. Note, firstly,
that under this implementation, CASE 1 and CASE 2 are accounted for automati-
cally, since the fact that Charla self-identifies as a woman in both becomes itself a
relevant normative and theoretical consideration that renders (G) true in this
context. Secondly, CASE 3 is also accounted for, though Charla doesn’t self-
identify as a woman: since her self-identification is not required, the normative
and theoretical considerations alone rule that (G) is true in this context. This
provides Díaz-León with a unitary explanation of divergent cases, some in which
self-identification is present, some in which it is not.
14 A very shaky intuition, I confess. This raises again the issue of the role of intuitions in semantic
theorizing (see footnote 3). Against my intuition a reviewer gives the example of the New York
“queens” – gay men who refused to self-identify as women, and who fulfill (at least part of) the
conditions described in CASE 3, yet there is no tendency to take sentences similar to (G) that
involve them as true. So, putting weight on that intuition is neither here nor there. But maybe a
better case can be constructed. Barnes (2019), for example, brings to the fore the situation of
cognitively impaired people who lack the means to self-identify, yet are taken to be gendered. It is
not clear on the basis of what such people are taken to be gendered by Barnes (possibly biological
features play a role), but it is not difficult to conceive of a cognitively impaired trans person who
lacks the means to self-identify yet fulfills the conditions described in CASE 3. Such a case raises a
similar problem.
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The success of this version of the view is based on an asymmetry betweenmere
self-identification on one hand, and our best normative, and theoretical consid-
erations on the other: while the former can be converted into the latter, the latter
can be independent of the former. However, I think that counterexamples can be
given to this view, too. What we seek is a case in which self-identification is the
pivotal factor in making sentences like (G) true without it automatically becoming
a relevant normative and theoretical consideration that would also render (G) true.
Consider thus the following scenario:
CASE 4
Charla self-identifies as a woman. By doing so, she sets in motion a range of actions that
ultimately lead to the enslavement of all beings by an evil and powerful tyrant. The
enslavement of all beings wouldn’t have been possible without Charla self-identifying as a
woman. Had she not self-identified as such, the disastrous outcome could have been easily
avoided.
While I agree that in this case (G) is intuitively true and that Charla should count as
a woman, it is difficult to see how Charla’s self-identification as a woman can
become part of our best normative and theoretical considerations; after all, it was
her self-identification that directly led to the enslavement of the whole world.15 If
this scenario is not conclusive, consider the following, alternative one:
CASE 5
Charla self-identifies as awoman. By doing so, she sets inmotion a range of violent actions by
someone that ultimately lead to her being seriously harmed. This is a highly predictable
outcome. Had she not self-identified as such, the disastrous outcome could have been easily
avoided.
Again, it is hard to see how our best normative and theoretical considerations are
consistent with Charla being harmed as a result of her self-identifying as a woman.
At minimum, it is not transparently clear that they do.
To conclude the discussion of the five cases presented: while I do not take
them to raise insuperable problems for Díaz-León’s view, they do pose the question
of how exactly the two main tenets of her view ((i) and (ii) above) relate. While the
discussion has focused on the subject’s self-identification, the larger question is
whether there are other factors pertaining to the subject that could stand in tricky
15 Perhaps a finer distinction can be drawn here between various types of normative consider-
ations, some pertaining strictly to Charla self-identifying as a woman and some pertaining to the
consequences of her actions. This points to the need to say more about what the normative
considerations involved are. In the same connection, Barnes (2019, p. 25, footnote 47) notes that
there might be tensions between the moral and political considerations that drive the application
of a certain gender term to a subject. Díaz-León does not tackle any of these issues in her paper.
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relations with our best normative and theoretical considerations and, if so, what
moves are available to the subject-contextualist. It might turn out that the
complexity of the subject’s situation goes beyond the bounds of semantics per se
and spills into “pragmatics”. This would prompt us to consider elements having to
do with the broader context in which sentences like (G) might be uttered (e.g.,
whether said in a transphobic environment, or one of contestation, of political
struggle etc.), which in turn might urge us to ponder over the types of contextual
factors that could become relevant in determining the truth-value of sentences like
(G) and over how to choose between them in a given context. Such variabilitymight
results in a broader “contextualist” view.16 Regardless of the version of con-
textualism we might end up with, I don’t take the considerations in the last par-
agraphs, together with the points made in the previous sections, to provide
decisive objections to Díaz-León’s view. Rather, they are meant to flag certain
issues that should be further addressed.
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